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THE "INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS"
LITERATURE AND EFFICIENT
PRECAUTIONS
Richard Craswellt
By now, most contracts scholars are familiar with at least some of
the conclusions of the economic analysis of contract law. At a mini-
mum, the concept of "efficient breach" is now established in both the
literature and the casebooks, with even a cameo appearance in the
Second Restatement;1 and the idea of the most efficient risk-bearer
may also be familiar.2 At present, though, the legal academy has been
much less affected by the economic writings whose topic is usually
referred to as "incomplete contracts."
Part of my goal, in this Essay, is to present this economic literature
in a more easily accessible form. My more important goal, however,
is to highlight one shortcoming of that literature, at least as it has de-
veloped to date. While that literature has had a good deal to say about
some decisions that contracting parties must make-for example, the
decision to perform or breach, or the decision about how heavily to
rely on a contract-it has had little or nothing to say about other deci-
sions, including decisions about precautions that might reduce the
likelihood of an accidental breach. In this respect, the recent eco-
nomic literature has been (if anything) too single-minded in its com-
mitment to one particular mathematical model.
I begin, though, with a discussion of the similarities between the
newer literature and the older law-and-economics analysis. 3 Section I
t William F. Baxter-Visa International Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I am
grateful for comments and suggestions from Steven Shavell, and from the participants in the
AALS panel on incomplete contracts organized by Juliet Kostritsky.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory note (1981).
2 For an early discussion, see Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
3 For convenience, and for want of a better label, I will use the phrase "law-and-
economics analysis" to refer to the older literature that predates the newer "incomplete con-
tracts" literature. The label is misleading, since the newer "incomplete contracts" literature
could also be described (quite literally) as a form of "law-and-economics" analysis. My only
defense is that I have not been able to come up with a better label for the older literature and, in
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points out that, despite its perhaps unfortunate label, the newer litera-
ture does not depend, in any interesting way, on the fact that contracts
are "incomplete." Instead, the more important features of the newer
literature are its assumption that courts are unable to evaluate key
factual claims (discussed in Section II below), and its assumption that
the parties are almost always in a position to renegotiate their con-
tracts after new information comes to light (discussed in Section III).
These assumptions allow the newer literature to say important things
about two incentives of interest: the incentive of one party to perform
or to breach the contract, and the incentive of the other party to rely
on the first party's possible performance. But the newer literature has
so far ignored the incentive of either party to take precautions, as I
discuss in Section IV.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
It is unfortunate that the newer literature has acquired the label
"incomplete contracts." That label suggests a distinction: if some con-
tracts are incomplete then other contracts, presumably, must be com-
plete. And to many legal readers, that distinction will naturally sug-
gest a difference in how the legal system might treat these two kinds
of contracts. That is, the term "incomplete" suggests that a contract
has gaps in its terms, which will leave its content undefined unless the
law supplements it with some gap-filling rule, such as a default rule
or a maxim of interpretation. By contrast, a "complete" contract
would not seem to need any such supplemental legal rules, as a truly
complete contract could always be enforced according to its (com-
plete) terms.4
Indeed, this understanding of the distinction between complete and
incomplete contracts might well be useful for other purposes-for
example, in evaluating rules of contract interpretation-that do not
concern me here.5 Whatever the merits of that distinction for other
purposes, it is simply irrelevant to understanding the economic litera-
ture that goes under the name "incomplete contracts." Despite what
that label might suggest, this literature does not posit any distinction
any event, nothing of substance should turn on these labels.
4 See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imper-
fect World: What To Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incom-
plete Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 323 (2004).
5 For a recent economic article on contract interpretation, which adopts a distinction very
similar to the one just described, see Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of
Contracts, J. LAW ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming).
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between contracts that are complete and contracts that are incomplete.
Instead, this literature begins by assuming that contracts are incom-
plete (in a sense to be made clear below), and proceeds to ask how the
parties' incentives might be optimized by the careful design of other
legal rules: not rules governing the interpretation of contracts, but
rules defining the measure of damages (for example), or rules govern-
ing the process of renegotiation. In other words, as I explain below,
this newer economic literature takes as its task the design of efficient
legal alternatives that do not require completely specified contracts.
To demonstrate this point, it will help to be (slightly) more con-
crete. Consider two parties, S and B, who sign a contract under which
S is to deliver a good to B at some future time. To make the contract
interesting, suppose that there is some uncertainty about what the
future will hold. For instance, suppose S is not certain that she will be
able to produce the good at all, or is unsure how much it will cost to
do so. 6 But suppose that B is unwilling to wait for that uncertainty to
be resolved. Instead, B wants S to agree to a contract now, so that he
(B) can make plans that rely on the good's timely delivery.
From the standpoint of efficiency, there are many things we might
want a contract (or a body of contract law) to accomplish, even in this
relatively simple example. If there is uncertainty about the cost of
producing the good, we might want S not to produce in some circum-
stances, if it turns out that the cost of production far exceeds whatever
the good is worth to B. This is the so-called efficient breach question:
is it more efficient for S to perform (i.e., to produce and deliver the
good), or is it more efficient to breach? 7 But however this question is
answered, an efficient set of rules would also give both parties an
incentive to make all earlier decisions in an efficient manner. For
example, if B chooses whether and how heavily to rely on the prom-
ised delivery, we might want B to rely only to the extent that it is effi-
cient to do so, taking account of the potential benefits and the poten-
tial costs of greater or lesser reliance.8 And if S has any control over
her costs of production, we might want her to take efficient precau-
tions against any risks that would unduly increase her costs-taking
6 For convenience in the use of pronouns, all of my examples will assume a female seller
and a male buyer.
7 The earliest nontechnical analyses are Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract,
Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); John H. Barton,
The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, I J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972). The
first mathematical analysis is Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11
BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980).
8 The earliest mathematical analyses of this issue were Shavell, supra note 7; William P.
Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON.
39(1984).
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account, of course, of both the cost of those precautions and their
potential value in increasing the likelihood of successful delivery to
B.
Viewed from this standpoint, a "complete" contract might be
defined as one that specified exactly what S and B should do, in order
to achieve maximal efficiency, in every possible state of the world.
For example, such a contract would specify the exact conditions
under which S would have to deliver the good to B, as well as the
exact conditions under which she would be excused from delivery. A
complete contract (in this sense) would also specify the exact steps
that B would be allowed to take in reliance on the promised
delivery-or, perhaps, a range of different steps that B could take in
different circumstances, depending on just how likely delivery
appeared to be at any given time. The contract would also specify the
exact precautions that S was required to take-or, again, it might
specify different precautions in different circumstances, depending on
various circumstances that might affect either the cost or the value of
particular precautions.
There are, however, several reasons why no real contract will ever
be this complete.9 Some of the reasons are obvious ones having to do
with transaction costs. The world is a complicated place; drafting
contract terms takes time and effort; and if the contract is to have a
real-world effect, at some point the parties will have to stop refining
the language of their contract and begin their actual performance.
Indeed, in many cases there are an infinite number of possible states
of the world, so no contract could possibly be complete in the sense
of listing every possible contingency.
Less obviously, perhaps, the completeness (in this sense) of any
real contract will also depend on the rules of interpretation that are
applied.10 For example, a contract that says S will deliver 100 widgets
on July 1 could be considered "complete" (in the sense of not leaving
any gaps) if it is interpreted to mean that the seller must deliver those
widgets on July 1 regardless of anything else that might happen. But
this contract could also be described as "incomplete" if it is instead
interpreted as not saying anything one way or the other about what
happens if (for example) the closure of the Suez Canal prevents the
seller from delivering the widgets on time. Under that interpretation,
the contract leaves a "gap" by failing to specify a result in those
future states of the world in which the Suez Canal is closed. Thus, if
9 For a recent survey of these reasons, see Kostritsky, supra note 4.
10 As a number of authors have observed, for example, Alan Schwartz, Relational Con-
tracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 271, 272-73 (1992).
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incompleteness is defined by whether the contract leaves gaps, we
cannot even classify a contract as "complete" or as "incomplete"
without first choosing between the various competing
interpretations.
As noted earlier, though, the economics literature that bears the la-
bel "incomplete contracts" is not really concerned with distinguishing
between contracts that are complete or incomplete in the sense de-
scribed above. Instead, this literature is concerned with a narrower
and more specific problem: the problem of designing a set of rules, to
be adopted either by contract or by the legal system itself, that can
simultaneously optimize both parties' incentives in a world subject to
two important limitations: (a) courts are imperfect decision-makers,
and (b) parties can always renegotiate their contracts. As each limita-
tion is central to the "incomplete contracts" literature, I will address
them separately.
II. IMPERFECT COURTS
Return to my example of a contract between S and B, entered into
at a time when there was some uncertainty about S's future cost of
production. Suppose now that, if all the relevant incentives were
taken into account, it would be efficient to grant S an excuse when-
ever her costs increased by more than 127 percent. If courts were able
to measure S's costs with no risk of error, achieving the ideal result
would simply be a matter of granting an excuse whenever her costs in
fact went up by more than 127 percent.
In practice, though, courts may not always be in a good position to
measure S's costs, especially if some of those costs involve hard-to-
quantify variables. More generally, there are many other things that
courts also may be poor at measuring. In some cases, the most effi-
cient outcomes may depend on factors that are completely unobserv-
able (for instance, the efficiency of completing a consumer transac-
tion may depend on whether the consumer's tastes have changed in
some unobservable way). In other cases, the efficient outcome may
depend on factors that are observable to the contracting parties, but
that cannot be proved to the satisfaction of a reviewing court (for ex-
1 In this respect, Kostritsky unduly limits her focus when she distinguishes (i) judicial
decisions that fill the gaps of an incomplete contract, which she refers to as judicial "interven-
tions" that require justification, from (2) judicial decisions that merely "giv[e] the express terms
their ordinary meaning," which she treats as unproblematic. Kostritsky, supra note 4, at 324 n.3.
Giving terms their "ordinary meaning" is, of course, one way to resolve the question as to how
those terms should be interpreted--but that particular solution requires justification just as much
as any other.
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ample, the seller's costs may include opportunity costs that a court
would find hard to evaluate). In the newer literature on incomplete
contracts, these two difficulties are often referred to (respectively) as
involving information that is either unobservable or nonveifiable.
2
As is probably obvious, these judicial imperfections complicate the
task of designing an efficient legal regime. After all, if courts could
perfectly evaluate the efficiency of any private action, it would then
be trivially easy to design a legal regime that optimized every incen-
tive. For instance, we could create incentives to choose an efficient
level of reliance by adopting a rule that favored any party who relied
efficiently, and/or a rule that penalized any party who relied ineffi-
ciently.' 3 Similarly, we could encourage efficient breaches (and dis-
courage inefficient breaches) by penalizing breachers if, but only if, a
court decided that their breach was inefficient. In this respect, a hypo-
thetical perfect court system-that is, a system capable of costlessly
and perfectly determining the efficient action in every possible state
of the world is the ex post equivalent of a perfectly complete contract,
in which the parties themselves are capable of costlessly and perfectly
specifying the efficient action in every possible state of the world.
Either of these systems, if they actually existed, would allow us to
achieve the first-best efficient results.
As noted earlier, though, it is not very realistic to expect our court
system to be perfect. In particular, the recent literature on incomplete
contracts generally assumes that the efficiency of key decisions can-
not be evaluated perfectly by courts. After all, evaluations of effi-
ciency generally depend on comparing various costs and benefits. If
some of those costs or benefits are either unobservable or nonverifi-
able, that bodes ill for any legal regime that expects the courts to
evaluate the efficiency of private actions.
As a consequence, the legal regimes that are analyzed in the in-
complete contracts literature are usually those that do not directly
reward or penalize a party based on the efficiency or inefficiency of
her decisions. Instead, that literature assumes these first-best regimes
to be infeasible, so it seeks to identify regimes that can create good
incentives without requiring courts to evaluate the efficiency of any
actual decision of the parties. In this respect, the literature on incom-
12 For a further discussion of these terms see, for example, Schwartz, supra note 10, at
279-80. Of course, if the parties are aware that certain variables are hard for courts to measure,
they are unlikely to write a contract that depends on those variables, which is yet another reason
why truly "complete" contracts are rarely if ever observed. For a more extensive discussion of
this point, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
13 For an early discussion of such a rule, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforc-
ing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE I.J. 1261, 1280 (1980).
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plete contracts might just as accurately be referred to as the literature
on "incomplete courts."
It is worth mentioning, though, that similar assumptions have often
been present (though not always explicitly) in more traditional law-
and-economics analyses. Consider, for example, the early analyses of
the problem of efficient breach. In many circumstances, the expected
value of a relationship can be maximized if one party does not carry
out her promise if something happens to make performance of that
promise inefficient. Creating just the right incentives to breach is not
easy, though, for the value of the parties' relationship is also maxi-
mized if the party does carry out her promise whenever it is still effi-
cient to perform. In principle, one way to give the performing party
both of these incentives-that is, to perform when performance is
efficient, and to breach when breach is efficient-would be to adopt
the equivalent of a negligence rule, which holds the breaching party
liable if (but only if) a court found that her breach was inefficient.
Indeed, if courts could perfectly evaluate the efficiency of a party's
breach (perhaps using something like the Learned Hand formula from
negligence cases 4), such a rule would create exactly the right per-
formance incentives.
Significantly, though, the earliest analyses of efficient breach
rarely even considered the possibility of a rule that required courts to
evaluate the efficiency of the breach. 15 Instead, the early analyses
pointed out that optimal breach incentives could also be created by
using a particular damage measure-specifically, a measure that
captured all of the harms inflicted by the breach-and by applying
that measure to all cases, regardless of whether or not the breach was
efficient. In effect, the earliest analysts were recommending an
approach that corresponded more to strict liability than to
negligence-and an approach that would be efficient for the same
reasons that strict liability is sometimes efficient. That is, if courts
could calculate the appropriate damage measure, this would force
breachers to internalize all of the costs of their breaches, thus,
deterring them from any breaches whose costs outweigh their
benefits. At the same time, this regime would still leave breachers
with an affirmative incentive to breach in any case where the benefits
of breach outweigh its costs (i.e., in any case where breach would be
efficient). Implicitly, then, the early analyses assumed that courts
14 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.).
15 Shavell briefly considered the possibility that the parties themselves could specify the
exact conditions under which breach would be efficient, but assumed (for purposes of his analy-
sis) that neither the courts nor the parties would be able to implement such an approach. Shavell,
supra note 7, at 468-69.
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could not evaluate whether the breach itself was efficient, but that
courts could measure all of the damages that the breach inflicted.
1 6
The failure of earlier law-and-economics scholars to consider the
possibility of a "negligence" rule for efficient breaches is particularly
striking in light of the fact that, in the contemporaneous economic
analysis of tort law, the choice between strict liability and negligence
was one of the most frequently analyzed issues.
17
In short, assumptions about the limits of the court system have
been a hallmark of all economic analyses, not just the most recent
literature on "incomplete contracts." To be sure, the assumption that
courts cannot evaluate the efficiency of a particular action at all will
sometimes be too extreme. In many cases, courts may be able to
evaluate particular actions imperfectly (which is to say, with some
risk of error), and sometimes even an imperfect evaluation will be
enough to alter the parties' incentives.' 8 As this possibility is being
discussed elsewhere, I will not dwell on it here.' 9
Im. Ex POST RENEGOTIATION
Instead, I turn now to another important aspect of the "incomplete
contracts" literature. That literature usually takes it as given that the
parties are capable of renegotiating their contract at any time. The
possibility of renegotiation makes it easier for a legal regime to give
parties the right incentives to make an efficient choice between per-
formance and breach. At the same time, though, the possibility of
renegotiation makes it significantly harder for a legal regime to give
parties the right incentives to make various other choices efficiently.
A. Efficient Performance or Breach
Consider again the hypothetical contract between S and B, entered
into at a time when S is still unsure what her costs of production will
turn out to be. The "efficient breach" argument discussed earlier
16 For a subsequent discussion emphasizing this aspect of the "efficient breach" analysis,
see Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1544-47 (1984).
7 See, e.g., John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1973).
18 For an early model of this possibility, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and
the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994). See also Richard
Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 501-03 (1996);
George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott
Theory of U.C.C. Article 2,62 LA. L. REV. 1065 (2002).
19 See Robert E. Scott & George E. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Con-
tract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 187 (2005).
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implies that the most efficient outcome is for S to produce and deliver
the product if, but only if, her cost of production and delivery turns
out to be less than the value of the product to the buyer, B. As noted
earlier, one way to give the seller the right incentive is to make her
internalize (if she fails to deliver) the buyer's entire losses from
nondelivery.
If the parties can renegotiate, though, the damage rule becomes
much less important (insofar as this particular incentive is concerned),
because-as the law-and-economics literature noted early on-
renegotiation should create efficient incentives to perform or breach
under virtually any damage rule.20 For example, if the threat of a high
damage remedy would otherwise deter the seller from breaching,
even when it would no longer be efficient for the seller to perform,
the seller should be able to avoid delivery by renegotiating and buy-
ing her way out of the contract, paying the buyer an amount that is
less than her own cost of performance but exceeds the value the buyer
would get from delivery. Indeed, many of the early criticisms of the
"efficient breach" analysis rested on just this point: as long as renego-
tiation is possible, breach (or performance) should be efficient under
any damage remedy.2'
Nevertheless, while the efficient breach problem becomes easy to
solve as long as the parties can renegotiate, there are other relevant
incentives that are not so easy to optimize. In particular, the incentive
that has received the most attention in the incomplete contracts litera-
ture is the incentive each party has to rely on a proposed transaction.
B. Efficient Reliance
The stylized example discussed earlier involved only one key vari-
able: the amount it would cost S to perform. Suppose now that the
buyer, B, can increase (or decrease) the value that performance will
have for his business, by spending more (or less) in reliance on the
contract.
For example, suppose that the contract calls for S to deliver a piece
of complicated machinery to B, and suppose that B must decide
whether to spend money customizing his existing equipment to work
201 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). For a formal mathematical analysis, see Rogerson,
supra note 8.
21 For a survey of the early law-and-economics literature on this point, see Richard
Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 630, 633-40 (1988).
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with the new machine. In particular, suppose that the value of the new
machine will be greater if B does spend the money to customize his
workplace-but suppose that if S fails to deliver the promised ma-
chine, most of these customization expenditures will be wasted. And
finally, suppose, that B must decide whether to spend this money be-
fore he knows whether S will actually deliver the machine, because
(as noted earlier) there is some uncertainty about whether S's costs
will be low enough to make it in her interest to perform.
This, in a nutshell, is the efficient reliance problem. If B's cus-
tomization expenses could all be recovered if S failed to deliver, or if
they could then be converted to some other equally valuable use, the
problem would become trivial, for in that case the expenditure would
be riskless to B. But as long as there is some chance that the expendi-
ture will be lost if S fails to deliver, or if there is some chance that not
all of its value will be recovered, the expenditure then becomes risky.
In that case, the efficient level of reliance expenditure will depend
on the various factors that affect the risk. Roughly speaking, the effi-
cient level of reliance will be higher if the downside is relatively low
(that is, as long as some or most of the expense can be recovered if
the seller fails to deliver). A higher level of reliance will also be effi-
cient when the upside is particularly high-for example, if spending
the money to customize the workplace would significantly enhance
the value of the new machine. Finally, the efficient level of reliance
will also be higher if there is a high probability that the seller will, in
fact, perform (for in that case, there is less risk that the reliance ex-
penditure will be wasted). As we saw in the preceding Section, if re-
negotiation is possible then the seller should decide to perform when-
ever her cost of performing is less than the value the buyer would get
from the machine. But if (as I have been assuming here) there is some
uncertainty over just how much it will cost the seller to perform-and
if the buyer must make his decision before that uncertainty has been
resolved-then the efficient level of reliance must be defined relative
to the ex ante likelihood that the seller will perform.
Of course, if the courts could themselves identify the efficient
level of reliance, it would be easy to design a legal regime that would
give the buyer the right incentives.22 But if we continue to assume
that courts lack the information needed to identify efficient reliance-
for example, if the value the buyer would get from performance is
either unobservable or nonverifiable-it then becomes rather more
difficult to design a legal regime that gives buyers their own incentive
to rely efficiently. Indeed, this very question (how can buyers be
22 See discussion supra Section H.
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given an incentive to rely efficiently?) has been the concern of much
of the most recent work on incomplete contracts.
For example, the earlier literature had noted that, if the parties
could somehow be blocked from renegotiating, any of several damage
remedies might optimize the buyer's reliance incentives. In particular,
as long as the measure of damages did not itself depend on the
buyer's level of reliance, the buyer's reliance incentives might then be
efficient.23 Under such a regime, the buyer would bear all of the extra
costs of any additional reliance expenditures, because any damages
the buyer might collect would not increase (by hypothesis) to cover
those extra expenditures. At the same time, the buyer would also reap
all of the extra benefits from any additional expenditures (in the event
that the seller decided to perform). And since the buyer would thus
capture both the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of addi-
tional reliance expenditures, this meant that the buyer's reliance in-
centives would be optimal.
If renegotiation is possible, however, the buyer's reliance expendi-
tures will almost always have some impact on the amount the buyer
recovers if the seller fails to perform. Recall, for example, that if the
seller's costs turn out to be higher than expected, the seller may have
to buy her way out of the contract by offering the buyer enough
money to buy her release.24 However, a buyer who has relied heavily
will lose a more valuable performance (more valuable precisely be-
cause of his additional reliance expenditures) if he agrees to release
the seller from the contract. As a consequence, such a buyer will
normally be able to demand a higher sum as the price of his release.
This, in turn, means that such a buyer will no longer be bearing the
full cost of his reliance expenditures, as some of that cost will (in
some cases) be recoverable in the form of a higher payment from a
defaulting seller. In short, when renegotiation is possible, it is harder
to design any simple regime to optimize buyers' reliance incentives.25
Building on this analysis, some of the incomplete contracts litera-
ture has tried to design solutions that make it harder (or impossible)
for the parties to renegotiate.26 Indeed, if the parties could make an
23 Shavell proved this result for two particular damage rules that did not depend on the
buyer's level of reliance: a rule of no liability at all (damages always equal to zero), and a rule
allowing the buyer to recover only his purchase price ("restitution" damages, in Shavell's termi-
nology). Shavell, supra note 7, at 480-87. For a less technical and more general analysis, which
considers all damage measures that do not depend on the buyer's reliance-including, for ex-
ample, stipulated damage clauses set at a constant amount-see Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort,
Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985).
24 See discussion supra Section IH.A.
25 For an early demonstration of this difficulty, see Rogerson, supra note 8.
26 See, e.g., Matthias Dewatripont, Commitment Through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
2005]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
enforceable agreement in which they committed not to renegotiate,
this might actually enhance the value of their relationship, if the gains
from improving their reliance incentives exceeded whatever they
gave up in flexibility by agreeing not to renegotiate.27 Under current
law, however, it is difficult if not impossible to make an agreement
not to negotiate that cannot itself be renegotiated.28
Other contributions to the incomplete contracts literature have
pointed out that, if the buyer can capture all of the surplus in any
renegotiation, the buyer's incentives may become optimal again,
because the ability to capture all of the surplus means that the buyer
will realize all the gains (as well as all the costs) of his reliance. 29 As
a result, some analysts have tried to define legal regimes in which the
buyer (or, more generally, the party choosing to rely) does, in fact,
have all of the bargaining power, by setting up special institutions in
which the buyer can make a "take it or leave it" offer.3° In still other
situations, the buyer's reliance incentives might be optimized by
structuring the contract so that the buyer (not the seller) is the party
most likely to breach in which case the damages could be based on
the seller's expected profits rather than on the buyer's reliance
31expenses.
As these branches of the incomplete contracts literature are already
well developed, I will not pursue them here. Instead, the next Section
with Third Parties, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 377 (1988). On the role of renegotiation generally in
the incomplete contracts literature, see Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988).
27 Dewatripont, supra note 26. For a similar model, in which the parties to a contract
might benefit by making it more costly for them to renegotiate later, see Alan Schwartz & Joel
Watson, Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting (Yale Law School, Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 242, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.ta?.
abstract id=224444.
28 For a useful discussion of this issue, see Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Com-
mitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997).
29 Rogerson, supra note 8; Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, Option Contracts and
Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem, 26 RAND J. ECON. 163 (1995).
30 E.g., Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Rey, Renegotiation Design with
Unverifiable Information, 62 ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994); Hart & Moore, supra note 26; Eric
Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON.
STUD. 83 (1999). Of course, these renegotiation mechanisms will not have the desired effect
unless they themselves cannot be avoided by subsequent renegotiation.
31 E.g., Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment
Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98 (1996). Perhaps significantly, this latter
approach suggests a possible justification for supra-compensatory stipulated damage clauses-a
remedy that was difficult if not impossible to justify in the earlier law-and-economics analyses.
Compare Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 33 (2003) (defending, at least as a matter of theory, supra-compensatory damage clauses),
with Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 147 (1984) (rejecting any efficiency justification for damage clauses that are
known in advance to be supra-compensatory).
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highlights another relevant incentive that has received much less at-
tention in the modem economics literature. Putting it in terms of the
stylized model sketched earlier, what if S has some control over the
probability that her costs will (or will not) be low enough to make it
in her interest to perform the contract? To put it in less formal lan-
guage, what if the seller's ability to perform may be affected by the
precautions that she takes?
IV. EFFICIENT PRECAUTIONS
In some cases, a party's ability to perform may be affected by the
risk of events over which she has no control. In many cases, though,
the performing party has a good deal of control over those risks, in
that she can reduce their likelihood by taking appropriate precautions.
The builder in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,32 for example, might have
reduced the likelihood of using the wrong brand of pipe if it had spent
more time and effort monitoring its purchase of supplies. Similarly, a
product manufacturer can usually reduce the frequency of defective
products by spending greater amounts on quality control. In this Sec-
tion, I will use "precaution" to refer to any costly step that reduces the
probability of an event that would make it harder to perform under a
contract.33
The very earliest law-and-economics analyses had little to say
about precautions, for they focused instead on a party's incentives to
make a deliberate choice between performing and breaching.34 To be
sure, those analyses did posit some probability of an event that would
make performance more difficult, such as an increase in the seller's
costs (if the seller was the party whose incentives were being ana-
lyzed) or a reduction in the buyer's demand (when analyzing the
buyer's incentives). In these early models, however, the event that
made performance more difficult was treated as being completely
beyond the control of either party. Instead, the focus of these models
was on the choice either party might make after the bad event oc-
cuffed: would the party have an incentive to perform the contract any-
way, or would she have an incentive to breach?
It did not take long, though, for other analysts to explore the incen-
tives for efficient precautions. For example, in a relatively early arti-
cle, Lewis Komhauser modeled the incentives of a manufacturer to
spend money on quality control in order to reduce the probability of a
32 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
33 For a similar usage, see Cooter, supra note 23.
34 See, e.g., Birmingham, supra note 7; Barton, supra note 7; Shavell, supra note 7.
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defective product that would violate the manufacturer's warranty.35
Kornhauser concluded that, under the assumptions of his model, the
manufacturer would have an incentive to choose an efficient level of
precautions if she were held liable (in the event of a defect) for all of
the losses actually caused by the defect. This conclusion paralleled a
familiar result in the economics of tort law, where strict liability can
give potential tortfeasors an incentive to take efficient precautions
against accidents as long as the tortfeasors are held liable for the full
costs each accident imposes.36 But it also paralleled (in a way) the
results of the early analyses of efficient breach, where strict liability
for all resulting losses can give potential breachers an incentive to
breach when, but only when, breach would be more efficient.37 In
spite of these similarities, though, the analysis of precautions in con-
tract law continued to receive less attention than did the analysis of
deliberate decisions to perform or breach.38
Perhaps for this reason, the early literature on incomplete contracts
adopted the same focus on deliberate choices between performance
and breach. As noted earlier, the typical "incomplete contracts" model
posits some uncertainty about the seller's costs (or, in some models,
uncertainty about the buyer's valuation) so that, depending on how
the uncertainty is resolved, the seller (or buyer) may later be faced
with a deliberate choice between performing or breaking the contract.
In mathematical terms, the seller is assumed to know that there is a
distribution of possible costs, each with an associated probability; and
that at some point the seller's actual costs will be drawn from that
distribution, just as if "nature" were spinning a roulette wheel or
drawing a ball from an urn. However, the literature also typically as-
sumes that the seller can do nothing to influence that draw-say, by
spending more money on precautions that will reduce the odds of an
outcome that will make the seller's costs high. Instead, in these mod-
els the seller passively waits to find out what her costs turn out to be,
and only then does she make her key decision: the decision between
performing the contract, or breaching and paying damages.
To be sure, the models of incomplete contracts usually do model at
least one other decision, in which the other party to the contract
35 Lewis A. Komhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON.
691 (1983).
36 E.g., Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-17
(1980).
37 See supra text accompanying note 7.
38 There are though, plenty of exceptions to this generalization, which are far too numer-
ous to cite. Representative examples include Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 2; Cooter, supra
note 16; and Craswell, supra note 21.
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chooses a level of "investment., 39 If the seller, for example, is the
party whose costs may increase, the buyer may be modeled as choos-
ing how much to invest in reliance on the contract, by spending
money to increase the value that performance will have to him.40 This
sort of reliance investment has at least some similarities with what I
am calling an investment in precautions, for one way to take precau-
tions against injury from breach is to reduce the extent of one's reli-
ance on the contract.4
A. Precautions and Ex Post Renegotiation
There are, however, some important differences between reliance
investments and other kinds of precautions. For one thing, some pre-
cautions involve contracts where ex post renegotiation is not likely to
occur, because the precaution concerns an all-or-nothing risk. As
noted earlier, if ex post renegotiation can be eliminated, it is then usu-
ally easier to optimize the incentives of the party who is choosing the
investment.
That is, the real difficulty in optimizing precaution incentives
comes (not surprisingly) when ex post renegotiation is possible. If
renegotiation is impossible, a damage rule of full liability for the
resulting losses is efficient because it requires the seller to internalize
all of the benefits of precaution investments, as well as bear all the
costs of those investments.42 If renegotiation is possible, however-
say, if a fire in the seller's factory makes widgets more expensive to
produce, but not so expensive as to eliminate the possibility of trade
entirely-the seller may then be able to renegotiate the price of
performance (or the price of her release from the contract) in ways
that leave the seller bearing less than the full costs of the accident or
43reaping less than the full benefits of her precautions. In that case, a
rule of full liability may no longer optimize the seller's precaution
incentives.44
39 Thus, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott recently described the "canonical" contracting
problem as one of "ensuring both efficient ex post trade and efficient ex ante investment." By
"ex post trade," they refer to the efficient perform-or-breach decision, and by "ex ante invest-
ment," they refer to efficient reliance. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 545 & n.4. Nowhere
does the article even mention investments in precautions, as I use that term here.
40 See discussion supra Section hI.B.
41 Cooter, supra note 23, discusses this similarity.
42 Komhauser, supra note 35. In Komhauser's model, ex post renegotiation was assumed
to be impossible.
43 The analogous point for reliance investments was discussed supra in the text accompa-
nying note 25.
44 For an early recognition of this point in the law-and-economics literature, see Varouj A.
Aivazian, Michael J. Trebilcock, & Michael Penny, The Law of Contract Modifications: The
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Significantly, though, some precautions involve risks that effec-
tively eliminate the possibility of ex post renegotiation. Suppose, for
example, that widgets carry some risk of spontaneously exploding.
The seller may, of course, be able to reduce that risk by taking more
care in her production process-but whether that risk materializes or
not, in neither case is there likely to be any ex post renegotiation. (If
the widget does not explode, there will be no reason for the parties to
renegotiate their original contract; and if the widget does explode,
there will be nothing left to negotiate over.) In this case, then, Korn-
hauser's conclusion remains valid: the seller's incentive to take pre-
cautions will be optimized by holding her liable for the full value of
the product in the event that it explodes. Indeed, in this situation,
damage measures that are too large might be counterproductive by
inducing the seller to take too high a level of precautions. 45
B. Precautions as Cooperative Investments
A second difference between precaution investments and reliance
investments-which is relevant if ex post renegotiation is possible-
stems from the fact that most investments in precautions are chosen
by one party, but their effect is to benefit the other party to the con-
tract. In the terms used by the incomplete contracts literature, an in-
vestment in reliance is a self-investment (i.e., an investment whose
benefits accrue to the investor himself) while an investment in pre-
cautions is a cooperative investment (i.e., an investment whose bene-
fits accrue to the other party).46 For example, if a seller decides to
spend more money on quality control, the buyer is the party who po-
tentially benefits from this expenditure, because the buyer's chance of
receiving a nondefective (or nonexploding) product will thereby in-
crease. By contrast, if the buyer invests more in reliance on a contract,
the buyer himself will be the one who reaps the potential benefit from
that expenditure.
The reason this matters is that, when ex post renegotiation is pos-
sible, it is much harder to create incentives for one party to choose an
efficient level of a cooperative investment. With a self-investment,
the investing party already reaps most of the benefits of the invest-
ment (as well as bearing all of its costs), so that party's incentives can
Uncertain Questfor a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 173 (1984).
45 Compare the suggestion, discussed supra in noje 31, that supra-compensatory damage
measures might be used to create efficient incentives for a buyer's reliance investment.
46 Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative Investments and the Value of Con-
tracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125 (1999).
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be optimized if she can somehow be allowed to capture the rest of her
investment's benefits.47 With a cooperative investment, though, the
investing party typically captures none of the investment's benefits
(while still bearing all of the investment's costs). This makes it more
difficult to optimize the investing party's incentives.
48
V. CONCLUSION
In the early days of a scholarly literature, it is perfectly natural for
scholars to focus on a particular subset of issues. No paper can ana-
lyze every issue at once, and a careful analysis of some issues may
pave the way, in succeeding papers, to an equally careful analysis of
others.
If one is drawing real-world implications from a body of scholar-
ship, though, it is important to keep track of which issues have been
analyzed and-perhaps even more important-which issues have not.
The literature on incomplete contracts provides a useful reminder of
this point, for (as I have argued here) that literature is far more ad-
vanced on some issues than it is on others. In particular, that literature
is still at a very early stage in its analysis of parties' incentives to take
efficient precautions.
Indeed, once one approaches the issue from this standpoint, one
can think of any number of other issues that have yet to be analyzed.
For example, the incomplete contracts literature generally takes the
parties' information about the relative risks and probabilities as
given-yet one effect of contract law and contracts is to alter the
parties' incentives to gather information in the first place. 49 The
incomplete contracts literature also typically treats the identity of the
contracting parties as given-but contract law can also affect the
parties' incentives to select or search for the parties with whom they
contract. 50
47 See supra text accompanying note 30.
4 As demonstrated by Che & Hausch, supra note 46. For a slightly less technical discus-
sion, see Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 31, at 49-52.
49 For discussions of this incentive see, for example, Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Dis-
closure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Richard Craswell,
Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401
(1988).
50 For some (highly technical) analyses of this issue, see Peter A. Diamond & Eric
Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 282 (1979); P.A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and
Breach of Contract I1: A Non-Steady State Example, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 165 (1981). For a
more recent example drawing on the incomplete contracts literature (and considering yet an-
other form of "cooperative" investment), see Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath & Andrew
Postlewaite, Efficient Non-Contractible Investments, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Research Department Staff Report #253 (Aug. 1998), available at http://research.mpls.frb.
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In short, contracts and contract law affect many choices along
many different margins, and it is important not to lose sight of those
choices that have not yet been thoroughly analyzed. To be sure, this
may make the resulting analysis even more complex than it already is.
But the world is, in fact, a complex place, and-to some of us, at any
rate-that's part of what makes it so interesting.
fed.us/research/SR/SR253.pdf.
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